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The species problem and the debate about spe-
cies concepts have been shaking up both evolution- 
ary biology and taxonomy for decades or even 
centuries (Wilkins 2009), but over the last 10 or so 
years the paradigmatic shift from the biological 
species concept (BSC) to the phylogenetic species 
concept(s) (PSC) has added a new dimension to the 
discussion: taxonomic inflation (Isaac et al. 2004), i. e. 
the artificial increase of species number of a taxon 
through splitting, mainly through raising former sub-
species to species rank. The debate was initiated in 
the context of mammalian taxonomy, and a number 
of studies, commentaries and rejoinders by adhe-
rents of the diagnosability version of the PSC and 
its critics have been published recently (Avise 2000; 
Meiri and Mace 2007; Frankham et al. 2012; Gippoliti 
and Groves 2012; Gippoliti et al. 2013; Groves 2013; 
Heller et al. 2013, 2014; Zachos et al. 2013a, b; Za-
chos and Lovari 2013; Cotterill et al. 2014; Zachos in 
press). In this commentary, I raise some of the dis-
cussed points that I consider particularly important 
and then list a number of recent examples of what I 
consider excessive splitting of some ruminant spe-
cies.
First of all, it should be made clear that there is 
nothing wrong with species splitting per se and that 
taxonomic inflation is not a necessary consequence 
of splitting. Cryptic diversity and cryptic species 
are real, and it is also true that many taxa, even 
among mammals, are understudied and often have 
not been revised for decades. Thus, the number of 
species in general and the number of mammal and 
ruminant species in particular will likely increase for 
good reasons (some examples of two or more line-
ages subsumed under a single species at present 
or until recently include badgers, clouded leopards, 
probably African elephants and possibly also giraffe, 
see Zachos et al. 2013a; but doubtless there are 
many more). So, my criticism should not be misun-
derstood as opposed to species splitting in general! 
We certainly possess only superficial knowledge of 
the biodiversity in many, if not most groups of or-
ganisms, and present species lists are consequent-
ly often only the tip of the iceberg. The species we 
have missed so far will not always be those that we 
have not yet seen, but perhaps equally often (and 
probably much more often in the case of mammals) 
those that we have not yet recognised, i. e. those 
that are subsumed under a single name with one or 
more other species (cryptic species).
That said, I have serious doubts as to whether 
the Phylogenetic Species Concept is a scientifically 
sensible approach to uncovering and taxonomical-
ly acknowledging this cryptic diversity. In the case 
of the Ruminantia, it is mainly the work of Groves 
and Grubb (2011), whose bovid taxonomy has also 
been adopted in the ungulate volume of the Hand-
book of the Mammals of the World (Groves and Les-
lie jr. 2011), that has triggered a debate. The bovids 
in particular, of which Groves and Grubb (2011) ack-
nowledge 279 compared to 143 in Grubb (2005), 
have been contentious. To be sure, the data basis 
for this work is impressive and the fruit of hard labour 
over years or decades of measuring museum ma-
terial throughout the world, but the taxonomic con-
clusions rest solely on the diagnosability version of 
the Phylogenetic Species Concept (dPSC). I have ar-
gued elsewhere why particularly the dPSC is a poor 
guide to delimiting species (Zachos and Lovari 2013 
and Zachos in press). The main arguments can be 
quickly summarised as follows:
Practically any and every population will be dia-
gnosably distinct given enough resolution power 
of the traits analysed (this point has been raised by 
Zitteliana B 32 (2014) 214
a prime example of the shortcomings of the dPSC 
– practically every population is diagnosably distinct 
and will have to be assigned species status. This is 
an unnecessary burden on conservation by reducing 
population numbers, limiting management measures 
(genetic rescue, (re)introductions etc. would have to 
be carried out across species boundaries) and, not 
least, devaluing the species category in both scienti-
fic and public circles. But even if one were to accept 
the dPSC, this taxonomic revision would be rash 
because of the very small sample sizes which, for 
the various populations or species, are mostly < 10, 
often < 5 and sometimes n = 1. No taxonomic con-
clusion, let alone the erection of 10 new species, is 
warranted by such a data set.
Red deer
Red deer species have also been extensively mul-
tiplied by Groves and Grubb (2011). There has been 
a long discussion about whether the red deer/wapi-
ti complex should be regarded as a single species 
(Cervus elaphus) or two species: red deer (Cervus 
elaphus) in Europe, western and central Asia and 
wapiti (Cervus canadensis) in eastern Asia and North 
America. There is actually a cladistically interesting 
relationship here in that wapiti cluster together with 
sika deer to the exclusion of the western red deer. 
This is a borderline case with good arguments for 
both sides (and perhaps best depicted in the frame of 
the superspecies concept). In point of fact, this kind 
of borderline case is exactly one of the predictions 
of evolutionary theory: if species evolve and give rise 
to new species, then all gradations of differentia- 
tion should be found in nature from a single lineage 
via a grey area of one or two (or more) lineages to 
two separate lineages. The grey area will always be 
something that taxonomy cannot adequately repre-
sent – there can be one species or two, but hardly 
one and a half (it is here that the concepts of subspe-
cies and superspecies have their origin, with all their 
shortcomings). The picture of well-differentiated taxa 
on the Tree of Life, separated by gaps, is only true 
if one zooms out, as it were, so that the often blur-
red boundaries between species become invisible. 
Now, instead of two red deer-like species, Groves 
and Grubb (2011) list 12. This is a nice example of 
the diagnosability trap and the inconsistency about 
whether diagnosability is an operational or an onto-
logical criterion (see above). If diagnosability aims at 
detecting lineages, populations that are known to be 
distinct lineages must be given species status even 
in the absence of diagnosability (or absence of a 
diagnosability analysis). Why, then, are insular red 
deer from the Tyrrhenian islands (Sardinia and Corsi-
ca), that are traditionally classified as Cervus elaphus 
corsicanus, given species status (C. corsicanus) 
while the island population(s) from the British Isles 
is (are) not? And further, why are Tyrrhenian red deer 
lumped into the same species C. corsicanus with 
the North-African Barbary deer (usually classified as 
others as well, e. g. Heller et al. 2014). That holds 
for any type of marker, but of course the advent of 
genomics is what one thinks of first in this context. 
Thus, it is basically a function of the traits analysed 
(and the sample size) whether a population is gran-
ted species status. The claim of superior objectivity 
made by adherents of the dPSC is not tenable; they 
simply ignore that being a lineage is not enough for 
species status unless indeed every lineage is a spe-
cies. That, however, is to my knowledge not even 
claimed by the most ardent PSC proponents. If that 
were the case, each and every island population, 
captive breeding group etc. would be a distinct spe-
cies. The objectivity claim of the PSC simply neglects 
that there will always be an element of convention 
or arbitrariness in deciding which hierarchical level 
of lineages in the Tree of Life (which is nothing but 
a huge encaptically structured system of lineages!) 
should be acknowledged taxonomically as the spe-
cies rank. Apart from the sensible requirement that 
species be lineages (ontological criterion) there must 
be additional (operational!) delimitation criteria. By 
making diagnosability the yardstick for species re-
cognition (because non-diagnosable lineages are 
denied species status), diagnosability is no longer 
an operational proxy for the detection of an evo-
lutionary species sensu Wiley (1978) (as intended) 
but becomes the ontological definiens of species it- 
self. This is then, ironically, a typological approach – 
something that the dPSC is believed to overcome by 
its proponents (see Cotterill et al. 2014) and that they 
accuse their critics of (Cotterill et al. 2014, particu-
larly pp. 823, 826 and 829). Interestingly, sometimes 
adherents of the dPSC are very much aware of the 
inconsistency in their equating species with lineages 
and vice versa: In this volume, Colin Groves quotes 
from other publications: „Every lineage is a species“, 
only to go on by saying that genera and families are 
also lineages but at a higher hierarchical level. It is 
very obvious then that not every lineage is a species!
This may suffice; a more detailed discussion of 
this topic and both viewpoints (for and against the 
dPSC) can be found in the cited publications and re-
ferences therein. Here I discuss briefly the klipsprin-
ger and red deer examples taken from Groves and 
Grubb (2011) which I consider excessive splitting of 
ruminant species and which are oddly reminiscent of 
the famous splitting of North American brown bears 
(Ursus arctos) into 82 separate species by Merriam 
(1918), which is the archetypical example of taxono-
mic inflation. 
Klipspringer
The klipspringer (Oreotragus oreotragus) is per-
haps the most obvious ruminant example of what 
has been regarded as oversplitting leading to taxono-
mic inflation (Heller et al. 2013; Zachos et al. 2013a). 
Groves and Grubb (2011) do not just acknowledge 
a single species, but no less than 11, based on dia-
gnosable morphometric differences. I consider this 
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producing spurious results (Allmon 1992; Bertrand et 
al. 2006; Zachos 2006).
In conclusion,
•  Cryptic diversity is real in many cases and needs 
to be acknowledged taxonomically! Our species 
lists at present will often seriously underestimate 
the true amount of biodiversity.
•  Ontologically, species taxa are individuals, not 
classes (while the species category is a class, not 
an individual). These individuals are lineages in 
the Tree of Life. This is a definition of the species 
taxon. To delimit species, i.e. to determine the 
boundaries between two or more species taxa, 
we need additional operational criteria. These cri-
teria serve to delimit species (not to define them!) 
and as guidelines as to which hierarchical level of 
encaptic lineages we want to call species.
•  The claims of adherents of the PSC, particular-
ly the dPSC, that their approach enables taxo-
nomists to objectively delimit species is illusory. 
Because every species is a lineage, but not every 
lineage is a species, there is always an element 
of convention as to where to draw the line of the 
species lineage. The dPSC uses diagnosability to 
draw that line, but given high-resolution markers, 
every population lineage becomes diagnosable. 
Yet, not every population is acknowledged as a 
species even under the dPSC, which makes it in-
consistent. Also, by denying non-diagnosable (if 
indeed there are any) allopatric populations spe-
cies status, diagnosability is not anymore an ope-
rational criterion to identify (i.e. diagnose or disco-
ver) lineages/species, but becomes an ontological 
definition of species. This reeks of typology. The 
dPSC is therefore theoretically and practically in-
consistent.
•  Linnean categories are a pre-Darwinian relict in 
taxonomy, and until we finally get rid of them, 
biological systematics will continue to contain an 
element of pseudoscience.
•  There is a great need for standardised procedures, 
ideally based on quantitative criteria, to delimit 
mammalian species. For birds, such a suggestion 
was recently published (Tobias et al. 2010), but it 
is still lacking for mammals.
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C. e. barbarus)? Both are completely isolated, and 
while they are similar, they are doubtless diagnos-
ably different with high enough resolution markers 
(and indeed are based on microsatellites, Hajji et al. 
2008). The claim of objectivity when it comes to the 
dPSC therefore turns out to be an illusion in taxono-
mic practice, even in that of its adherents…
Apart from these two cases, Heller et al. (2014, 
Table 1 and text) give a list of splittings proposed by 
Groves and Grubb (2011) (including the klipspringer) 
where there are statistical problems with the analy-
sis or where genetic data contradict diagnosability, 
suggesting that even by their own standards their 
splitting was excessive. Note that certainly not all 
splittings done by Groves and Grubb (2011) are un-
warranted, and an unknown number of those that I 
consider unfounded based on their data may turn 
out to be justified in the light of further research. It is 
not splitting per se that I am criticising, it is the un-
derlying philosophy that, in my view, is responsible 
for the creation of taxonomic inflation.
Groves‘ contribution to this volume is a supra-
specific classification of Ruminantia, thus not dealing 
with species delimitation, but he asks the very good 
question what the criteria are for assigning a certain 
rank to a taxon, a question that he admits needs a 
good answer if taxonomy is to be rigorously scienti-
fic. Unfortunately, there is no such answer, we must 
– at very long last – finally rid taxonomy of the bur-
den of this pre-Darwinian legacy. Linnean categories 
are arbitrary rank designations, and there is simply 
no feasible way of making them objective (because 
 then only sister taxa could be assigned the same 
rank, making necessary an almost infinite number 
of ranks, see Farris 1976 for deterrent examples). 
Groves offers time-rank associations as a solution 
(in various versions known as temporal banding and 
time clipping etc. in the literature: Avise and Johns 
1999, Avise and Mitchell 2007), but this does not 
work either (Avise and Liu 2011; Zachos 2011). The 
resilience against the abandonment of the Linnean 
categories is really astonishing, particularly since 
nothing is gained by using them – other than the illu-
sion of having lots of taxa of, say, family rank that are 
(falsely!) believed to be directly comparable when 
in reality one is dealing with apples and oranges. 
In this regard it is revealing that Groves (and many 
others) argue that a practical necessity for ranks is 
that the so-called higher categories are often used 
as proxies for biodiversity or endemicity. There is an 
argument here, but it is the other way around: pre-
cisely because ranks are arbitrary, biogeographers, 
palaeontologists and macroecologist should not rely 
on them when analysing diversity through time and 
space; rather, they should in each single case justify 
exactly which taxa are used and why they are deem- 
ed to be all apples or all oranges but not both! 
Taxonomic surrogacy, as it is called, is very prone to 
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